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1. Introduction 
The idea of modelling labour supply decisions as discrete choices has become more and more popular 
during the last two decades. In this paper we examine through a simulation exercise an issue that has 
received much less attention than it might deserve: the implications of alternative methods of 
representing the choice set within the discrete choice approach.  
 The discrete choice approach has gained a prominent position as an outcome of the 
process aimed at solving or circumventing some theoretical and computational problems to be faced in 
micro-econometric research when analyzing choices subject to complicated opportunity constraints. 
Let us consider the standard labour supply framework: 
(1.1) 
max ( , )
. .
0,≤ + ≥
U h x
s t
x wh I and h
  
where U is a deterministic utility function, x is consumption, h  represents hours of work, w is the 
(constant) hourly wage rate and I is the exogenous income. Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
associated to (1.1) – and assuming for simplicity an interior solution – under appropriate conditions 
one can obtain the optimal labour supply ∗h  as a function of w and I : 
(1.2) ( , )∗ =h h w I .  
Then some empirical specification of ( , )h w I can be estimated and used for example to simulate the 
effects of policies implying changes in w and/or in I. The linear budget constraint in problem (1.1), 
however, very rarely corresponds to reality. Considering a well-known example, taxes and transfers on 
income in general imply a non-linear constraint. The budget constraint would then be: 
(1.3) ( , )≤ + −x wh I wh Iτ ,  
where τ represents the tax-benefit rule that computes the taxes to be paid and the transfers to be 
received given gross incomes ( ,wh I ). Taking (1.3) into account, we might still be able to characterize 
the optimal solution as a function of w and I , 
(1.4) ( , )∗ =h h w Iτ   
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and estimate ( , )h w Iτ . However, ( , )h w Iτ depends on the current tax-benefit rule τ and therefore it 
cannot be used to simulate policies that introduce a different tax rule, say 'τ . The problem is that the 
behavioural function hτ  in general mixes up preferences and constraints1. More generally, the 
opportunity set might be defined by complicated budget and quantity constraints that do not even 
allow recovering a closed form solution for h ∗ . What we really need is an estimate of the utility 
function ( , )U h x itself. Once preferences are estimated, in principle we are able to simulate the effect 
of any policy by solving max ( , )U h x subject to the appropriate constraints. 
 A paper by Heckman (1974) probably for the first time took full account of the non-
linearity of the budget constraint in the estimation and simulation of microeconometric models. The 
problem addressed is the evaluation of a child related welfare policy that introduces significant 
complications in the budget set.  Heckman proposed a particular method of recovering preferences by 
using the conditions to be fulfilled by the marginal rate of substitution for h* to be located on a 
particular point of the budget set. Shortly after, a series of papers by Hausman and various co-authors 
proposed a method specifically addressed to piece-wise linear budget constraints (e.g. Hausman, 
1979). Both Heckman (1974) and Hausman (1979) work through the implications of the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions. The solution can be located in different ranges of values along the budget constraint. 
Corresponding to each possible range of values there is a condition involving the preference 
parameters. Choosing a convenient stochastic specification, we can express the probability that those 
various conditions alternatively hold, write down the sample likelihood and estimate the preference 
parameters. Useful presentations of this class of methods are provided by Moffit (1986) and Blundell 
and MaCurdy (2000).  
 Soon it emerged that the approach described above presents three main problems. First, it 
works well with convex budget sets (e.g. those generated by progressive taxation) and a two-good 
application (e.g. h and x in the individual labour supply application) but it tends to become 
computationally cumbersome when the agents face non-convex budget sets and when more than two 
goods are object to choice (e.g. when the agent is a many-person household). Second, in view of the 
computational problems, the above approach essentially forces the researcher to choose relatively 
simple specifications for the utility function or the labour supply functions  Third – in the approach 
proposed by Hausman and associates –  computational and statistical consistency of ML estimation of 
the model requires imposing a priori quasi-convexity of preferences (e.g. see MaCurdy et al., 1990).  
 Due to these emerging problems, applied researchers have started to make use of another 
innovative research effort also maturated in the first half of the 70's, i.e. the discrete choice modelling 
                                                     
1 ( , )h w Iτ is called “mongrel” labour supply function by Blomquist (1988). 
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approach developed by McFadden (1974). As far as the labour supply application is concerned, the 
approach essentially consists in representing the budget set with a set of discrete 'points'. Let  [ ]0, H  
be the (continuous) range of possible values for hours of work h. Let us pick K points 1 2, ,..., sh h h to 
"represent" [ ]0, H . The utility level attained at point k is ( , )k kU x h , where kx is obtained through 
some budget rule such as (1.4). Now let us assume that ( , )k kU x h is a random variable that can be 
decomposed additively into a systematic part containing the observable ( , )k kv x h and a random 
component kε that accounts for the effect of unobservables: ( , ) ( , )k k k k kU x h v x h ε= +  . The assumption 
that the random term kε  is Type I Extreme Value i.i.d. leads to the well known multinomial logit 
expression for the probability that point j (i.e. the job with hours hj) is chosen2: 
(1.5) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )1 1
exp ( ,
( ) Pr , max , ,..., ( ,
exp ( ,
j j
j j s s
i i
i
v x h
P j U x h U x h U x h
v x h
= = = ∑ . 
The corresponding likelihood function can then easily be computed and maximized in order to 
estimate the parameters of the utility function. This approach is computationally very convenient when 
compared to the previous one, since it does not require going through complicated Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions involving derivatives of the utility function and of the budget constraints. As a consequence 
it is not affected by the complexity of the rule that defines the budget set or by how many goods are 
contained in the utility function. Equally important, the deterministic part of the utility function can be 
specified as very flexible without worrying for the computational problems.  
 During the last two decades, this approach has become increasingly popular, starting with 
Aaberge et al (1995) and van Soest (1995). Within the literature adopting this approach there are 
however two potentially important issues that are worthwhile analyzing in their implications and that 
so far have not been given the attention they might deserve.  
 A first issue concerns the procedure by which the discrete alternatives are included in the 
choice set.  Most authors (e.g., among others, van Soest (1995), Duncan and Weeks (1997),  
Blundell, Duncan et al. (2000)), Kornstad and Thoresen (2004) choose (not probabilistically) a set of 
fixed points identical for every individual. By contrast, Aaberge et al. (1995) and Aaberge et al (1999) 
adopt a sampling procedure originally proposed by McFadden (1978) and also assume that the choice 
set may differ across the households.  
                                                     
2 A random variable ε  has a (standard) Type I extreme value distribution if ( ) ( )Prob exp exp( )≤ = − −k kε . 
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 A second issue concerns the availability of the alternatives. Most authors assume all the 
values in [ ]0, H  - or in some discrete subset - are equally available. At the other extreme, some 
authors (e.g. Zabalza et al. (1980) assume only two or three alternatives (e.g. non-participation, part-
time and full-time) are available for everyone. More generally, Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999, 2000, 
2004) assume that the hour opportunities in [ ]0, H  are not equally available to everyone. More 
specifically, they assume that there is a probability density function of opportunities for each 
individual. The discrete choice set used in the estimation (and subsequently in the simulations) is built 
by sampling from that individual-specific density function.  
 In what follows we explore by simulation the implications of  
- the procedure used to build the choice set (fixed alternatives vs sampled alternatives) 
- accounting vs not accounting for a different availability of alternatives 
upon the precision of the estimates and of policy simulation results (uniform availability vs 
heterogeneous availability).   
 As to the last issue, uniform availability (as for example in van Soest (1995) and Duncan 
and Weeks (1997) can be interpreted as a special case of heterogeneous availability (as in Aaberge et 
al. (1995, 1999), where the probability density functions of opportunities are assumed to be uniform 
and equal for everyone.  Since the approach taken by Aaberge et al. (1995, 1999) is more general, we 
will use their model as the “true” one in order to generate a sample, which will then be used in the 
simulation experiments.         
2. The “true” model 
The "true" model is defined along the lines adopted in Aaberge et al. (1995) as well as in several 
successive papers3. The individuals maximise their utility by choosing among opportunities defined by 
hours of work, hourly wage and non-pecuniary attributes of the job. The utility is assumed to be of the 
following form 
(2.1) ( )( , ), , ( ( , ), ) ( , , )U f wh I h j v f wh I h w h jε= + , 
where w is the wage rate, h is hours of work, I is exogenous income including the husband's labour 
income, f  is a function that transforms gross income into income after tax, i.e. ( ),f wh I  is disposable 
income (income after tax), j is a variable that captures other job characteristics and ε  is a random 
variable that is supposed to account for unobservables affecting tastes for a given job across 
                                                     
3 e.g. Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm, (1999, 2000, 2004) and Aaberge, Colombino, Strøm and Wennemo (2000). 
7 
individuals as well as across job opportunities for a given individual4. Commuting time or required 
skill are type of characteristics captured by j. The individual is supposed to choose a "job" from a 
choice set B that may differ across individuals. Each job alternative in B contains a wage rate w, hours 
of work h and unobserved (to the analyst) job characteristics such as environmental characteristics and 
skill content of the job. Moreover, B contains also non-market activities, i.e. jobs with w=0 and h=0. 
By assuming that ε  is type I extreme value distributed and that the specification (2.1) is valid, it turns 
out that the probability density that opportunities with hours h and wage rate w are chosen has the 
following expression5 
(2.2) 
( , )
exp( ( ( , ), ) ( , )( , ) Pr ( ( , ), ) max ( ( , ), )
exp( ( ( , ), ) ( , )x y B
v f wh I h p h wh w U f wh I h U f xy I y
v f xy I y p x y dxdy
ϕ
∈
⎡ ⎤
≡ = =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ∫∫ , 
where ),( whp is the density of choice opportunities which can be interpreted as the relative frequency 
(in the choice set) of opportunities with hours h and wage rate w. Opportunities with 0=h (and 0=w ) 
are non-market opportunities (i.e. alternative allocations of "leisure"). Thus, the density (2.2) will form 
the basis of estimating the parameters of the utility function and the choice sets. 
 In practice, the estimation adopts a discretized version of (2.2). Let ( , )q h w be some 
known joint density function (e.g. empirically fitted to the observations on h and w). Let us represent 
the latent choice set B with a sample S containing M points, where one is the chosen (observed) point 
and the other 1−M  are sampled from ( , )q h w . It can be shown (McFadden, 1978; Ben Akiva and 
Lerman, 1985) that consistent estimates of ( ( , ), )v f wh I h  and ( , )p h w can still be obtained when (2.2) 
is replaced by 
(2.3) ( )( )( , )
( , )
exp ( ( , ), ) ( , ) ( , )
Pr ( ( , ), ) max ( ( , ), )
exp ( ( , ), ) ( , ) ( , )x y S
x y S
v f wh I h p h w q h w
U f wh I h U f xy I y
v f xy I y p x y q x y∈
∈
⎡ ⎤
= =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ∑ . 
 We select a sample of married/cohabitating females. The systematic part of their utility 
function (2.1) is specified as follows 
                                                     
4 In most of the papers where the model is presented, the multiplicative specification is chosen, i.e. =U vε . We formulate 
here the model in the additive form in order to make it more easily comparable to similar models that appear in the literature. 
5 For the derivation of the choice density (2.2) see Aaberge et al. (1999). Note that (2.2) can be considered as a special case of 
the more general multinomial type of framework introduced by Ben-Akiva and Watanatada (1981) and Dagsvik (1994). 
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(2.4) 
( )
1
3
2 4
1
2
5 6 7 1 8 2 9 3
3
( , ) 1( , ) (
1log log ) ,
⎛ ⎞
−
= + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
−
+ + + + + ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
f wh Iv h w
LA A Ch Ch Ch
α
α
α α
α
α α α α α
α
 
where L is leisure, defined as ( )1 8736= −L h and h is yearly hours of work, A is age and Ch1, Ch2 
and Ch3 are number of children below 3, between 3 and 6 and between 7 and 14 years old. In the 
specification of the probability density of opportunities ( ),p h w we will assume that offered hours and 
offered wages are independently distributed. The justification for this is that offered hours, in 
particular normal working hours, are typically set in rather infrequent negotiations between employers 
and employees associations, while wage negotiations are far more frequent in which the hourly wage 
tend to be set independent of working hours. Thus, we specify the density of opportunities requiring h 
hours of work and paying hourly wage w as follows 
(2.5) ( ) 0 1 2
0
( ) ( ) if 0
,
1 if 0
>⎧
= ⎨
− =⎩
p g h g w h
p h w
p h
 
where p0 is the proportion of market opportunities in the opportunity set, and g1 and g2 are respectively 
the densities of hours and wages, conditional upon the opportunity being a market job.  
 In view of the empirical specification it is convenient to divide both numerator and 
denominator by 01− p  and define 00
01
=
−
pg
p
. We can then rewrite the choice density (2.2) as 
follows: 
(2.6) ( )
( ) ( )
0 1 2
0 1 2
0 0
exp ( , ) ( ) ( )
( , )
exp (0,0) exp ( , ) ( ) ( )
x y
v h w g g h g w
h w
v v x y g g x g y dxdy
ϕ
> >
=
+ ∫ ∫
 
for { }, 0>h w , and 
(2.7) ( )
( ) ( ) 0 1 2
0 0
exp (0,0)
(0,0)
exp (0,0) exp ( , ) ( ) ( )
x y
v
v v x y g g x g y dxdy
ϕ
> >
=
+ ∫ ∫
 
for { }, 0=h w . 
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 Offered hours are assumed to be uniformly distributed except for possible peaks 
corresponding to part time (pt), 18-20 weekly hours, and to full time (ft), 37-40 weekly hours. Thus, g1 
is given by 
(2.8) 
[ ]
( ) [ ]
[ ]
( ) [ ]
1
1
2
                                 if       1,17
exp                      if        18,20
( )                                   if       21,36
exp                     if        37,40
    
∈
∈
= ∈
∈
h
h
g h h
h
γ
γ π
γ
γ π
γ [ ]                              if        41,
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪ ∈⎩ h H
 
where H is the maximum observed value of h. Thus, this opportunity density for offered hours 
implies that it is far more likely to find jobs with hours that accord with full-time and standard part 
time positions than jobs with other working loads. 
 Since the density values must add up to 1, we can also compute γ  according to: 
(2.9) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 11 217 1 20 18) exp 36 21 40 37 exp 41Hγ π π −= − + − + − + − + − . 
Moreover we write 
(2.10) ( )0 0expg θ= . 
In Table 2.1 we refer to 021 , θππ and  as the parameters of the job opportunity density. The density 
of offered wages is assumed to be lognormal with mean that depends on length of schooling (Ed) and 
on past potential working experience (Exp), where experience is defined to be equal to age minus 
length of schooling minus five, i.e. 
(2.11) 20 1 2 3log = + + + +w Exp Exp Edβ β β β ση , 
where η is standard normally distributed. 
 Using (2.8) and (2.10) we can write the choice density as follows: 
(2.12) 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
0 2 0 1 1 2 2
0 2 0 1 1 2 2
exp ( , ), ln ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( , )
exp ( , ), ln ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
x y
v f wh I h g w d h d h d h
w h
v f xy I y g x d y d y d y dxdy
θ π π
ϕ
θ π π
+ + + +
=
+ + + +∫ ∫
, 
where 
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(2.13) [ ]
[ ]
0
1
2
( ) = 1 if  0;  0 otherwise
( ) = 1 if  18,20 ;  0 otherwise
( ) 1  if  37,40 ;  0 otherwise.
>
∈
= ∈
d h h
d h h
d h h
 
In what follows we will refer to 0 ( )d h as the “job” dummy, since it captures the relative frequency of 
market opportunities to non-market opportunities; we will refer to 1( )d h and 2 ( )d h as the "peaks" 
dummies, since they are meant to capture the "peaks" in the density of hours corresponding to part-
time and full-time jobs. 
 The estimation of the model is based on data for 1842 married/cohabitating females from 
the 1995 Norwegian Survey of Level of Living. We have restricted the ages of the females to be 
between 20 and 62 years in order to minimize the inclusion in the sample of individuals who in 
principle are eligible for retirement, since analysis of retirement decisions is beyond the scope of this 
study. Although the model adopted was originally developed for analysing simultaneous household 
partners’ behaviour, we focus here on women’s behaviour in order to simplify the execution and the 
interpretation of the simulation exercise. Husband’s income as well as the couple's non-labour income 
are treated as exogenous and included in disposable income ( , )f wh I . 
 The parameters appearing in expressions (2.3) – (2.10) are estimated by the method of 
maximum likelihood using the sampling procedure illustrated in expression (2.3). Each of the choice 
sets are represented by a set S that includes the observed choice plus 999 independent draws (h, w) 
from densities q(w, h) previously fitted to the observed values of w and h. If ( ,s sw h ) are the observed 
values for a particular individual, the corresponding contribution to the likelihood function is: 
(2.14)  
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
0 2 0 1 1 2 2
0 2 0 1 1 2 2
( , ), exp ln ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ln ( , )
( , )
( , ), exp ln ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ln ( , )
∈
+ + + −
=
+ + + −∑
s s s s s s s s s
s s
i i i i i i i i i
i S
v f w h I h g w d h d h d h q w h
P w h S
v f w h I h g w d h d h d h q w h
θ π π
θ π π
. 
 The estimates of the parameters of the opportunity density parameters and the parameters 
of the utility function are reported in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. 
 Based on the empirical distribution of the exogenous variable and on the estimates of 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 (to simulate the endogenous variables and choices) we generate a sample of 6×1842 
= 11052 observations, which is then used in the simulation exercise described in what follows.  This 
means that we simulate six independent optimum points for each of the females in the original data 
set. 
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Table 2.1. Hours and wage densities, Norway 1994 
 Parameter Estimate Std. Dev. 
Job opportunity    
 θ0 -0.60 (0.10) 
Hours 
 
  
Part-time  
1π    0.46 (0.10) 
Full-time 2π    1.57 (0.07) 
Wage  
  
  
 
0β    0.24 (0.01) 
 
1β    3.62 (0.05) 
 
2β    2.41 (0.26) 
 
3β  -3.67 (0.58) 
 σ    4.10 (0.35) 
 
Table 2.2. Estimates of the parameters of the utility functions for married/cohabitating females. 
Norway 1994 
Variable Parameter Estimate Std. Dev. 
Consumption    
 α1 0.39  (0.11) 
 α2 4.42  (0.44) 
Leisure 
 
  
 α3 -4.57  (0.53) 
 α4 168.88  (27.47) 
Log age α5 -94.29  (15.32) 
Log age squared α6 13.35  (2.16) 
Number of children below 3 years old α7 0.44  (0.23) 
Number of children 3-6 years old α8 1.23  (0.24) 
Number of children 7-14 years old α9 1.05  (0.19) 
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3. Alternative representations of the choice sets 
3.1 Selection of alternatives 
As we have already mentioned in the Introduction, the first issue in choice set representation concerns 
the procedure used to select the alternatives. In many applications, including labour supply modelling, 
the choice set contains a very large (or even infinite) number of alternatives. For instance, if we model 
couples labour supply and the decision period is the year, considering 1 hour intervals and 16 hours 
available during the day, there are 2(16 365) 34,105,600× =  alternatives. This would imply a very 
heavy computational burden, since for each alternative we must compute the couple's budget by 
applying a possibly complicated tax rule. Thus it is convenient to work with a smaller choice set 
somehow representative of the true one. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) present a detailed treatment of 
the procedures that might be used when the number of alternatives contained in the choice set is very 
large (or even infinite) so that a complete enumeration is computationally too costly: 
- Aggregation of alternatives 
- Sampling of alternatives     
The procedure consisting in selecting a fixed number of hours' values can be interpreted as an 
aggregation procedure. Instead of using all the possible values between 0 and T, the (0,T) range is 
divided into sub-intervals and then the mid (or maybe the average) value of h in each interval is 
chosen to 'represent' all the values of that interval. The authors adopting this procedure realize that it 
introduces measurement errors, but tend to assume they are of minor importance. For example van 
Soest (1995) reports that some experiments with a different number of points did not show significant 
differences in parameter estimates, however a systematic investigation of the implication of that 
procedure has never been done either theoretically or empirically. However, if one interprets the 
approximation as an aggregation procedure, the analysis provided by Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) 
can be applied to clarify the issue. 
 We will assume the average of h in each sub-interval is chosen as representative (instead 
of the more common procedure of choosing the mid point: of course the two are very close and in fact 
coincide if the values of h are continuous or if each interval contains an uneven number of values). Let 
us define (we drop the subscript of the household to simplify the notation): 
(3.1) ( )( , ),j j jv v f wh I h≡ . 
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Furthermore, let 1L jL
j L
v v
N ∈
≡ ∑ = average systematic utility in sub-interval L, where LN  = number of 
elements in L and Lh = average value of h in sub-interval L. 
 Ben-Akiva and Lerman show that the expected maximum utility attained on subinterval 
l is 
(3.2) ( )ln( ) lnv v N D= + +l l l l) , 
where ( ) 1exp j
j
D v v
N
≡ −∑l l l l . This last term is a measure of dispersion of v in sub-interval l . 
 Accordingly, the probability that a value of h belonging to sub-interval L is chosen is 
(3.3) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
exp ln( ) ln
exp ln( ) ln
L L Lv N D
P L
v N D
+ +
=
+ +∑ l l l
l
. 
To compare this with the expressions used in the fixed-alternatives approach it is useful to Taylor-
expand jv up to 2-order terms to get 
(3.4) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
exp ( , ), 0.5 ln( ) ln
exp ( , ), 0.5 ln( ) ln
L L L L L L
hh hh
hh hh
v f wh I h v N D
P L
v f wh I h v N D
σ
σ
+ + +
≅
+ + +∑ l l l l l l
l
, 
where hhσ
l is the variance of the values of h in sub-interval l  and lhhv  is the second (total) derivative 
of ( )( , ),v f wh I hl l  with respect to h l . 
 It would be pointless to use (3.4) for estimation since it requires the very same 
computations that one wishes to avoid by aggregating alternatives. However (3.4) is useful in order to 
understand the type and the extent of the errors we incur by using various approximations. The 
expression typically used in the literature is:  
(3.5) 
( )( )
( )( )
exp ( , ),
( )
exp ( , ),
L Lv f wh I h
P L
v f wh I h
= ∑ l l
l
)
. 
Clearly, in expression (3.5) all the terms ( )0.5 ln( ) lnhh hhv N Dσ + +l l l l are dropped. If these terms were 
equal across all the sub-intervals they would cancel out from (3.4) and (3.5) would be exact. In general 
however they will not be equal, and dropping them will lead to biased estimates. Nonetheless there are 
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ways by which we could improve upon (3.5) when adopting aggregation as an approximation strategy, 
which however has never been considered in the literature on labour supply modelling: 
- The dimension of N l of the sub-intervals - when not equal for all of them - is typically known 
and can be explicitly accounted for; 
- hhσ
l  can also be computed; 
- Depending on the functional form used for the utility function, the term hhv
l  might be explicitly 
evaluated and accounted for; 
- The terms ( )ln Dl in general will vary both across sub-intervals and across individuals; however 
we might capture at least some of their effect by introducing a set of dummies (as many as the 
number of sub-intervals - 1). 
Summing up, the aggregation of alternatives implies biased estimates. The bias could be moderated by 
using various possible corrections suggested by expression (3.4) itself. Up to now, however, it must be 
said that the literature on labour supply has treated this issue in a rather superficial way (when 
compared, for instance to the literature on transportation or location choices).   
 Sampling of alternatives, on the other hand, offers the possibility of working with a 
relatively small choice set and at the same time preserving the consistency of the estimates. The basic 
results were established by McFadden (1978). Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) also provide a very 
useful and more practically oriented survey, together with some additional theoretical results.   
 Let us represent the true choice set B with a sample S containing M points, where one is 
the chosen (observed) point and the other 1−M  are sampled from q. Let iq  be the probability of 
sampling point ih . It can be shown (McFadden, 1978; Ben Akiva and Lerman, 1985) that consistent 
estimates of ( ( , ), )v f wh I h  and ( , )p h w can still be obtained when the true choice set B is replaced by 
S and the probability of observing choice j is evaluated as follows: 
(3.6) 
( )
( )
exp ( ( , ), ) ln( )
( )
exp ( ( , ), ) ln( )
i
j j j
i i i
h S
v f wh I h q
P j S
v f wh I h q
∈
−
=
−∑ . 
If a simple random sampling is adopted, all the q’s are equal and cancel out. Typically more 
sophisticated sampling procedures are used since they are expected to be more efficient. For instance, 
a common procedure consists in using as sampling probabilities the observed relative frequencies of 
choice possibly differentiated according to personal characteristics of the decision units. Besides Ben-
Akiva and Lerman (1985), also Train et al. (1987) present a very detailed application of this 
procedure. 
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3.2 Availability of alternatives 
A second and possibly even more substantial issue is whether or not account is taken of the different 
availability of job-types on the market. Some authors have made the extreme choice of assuming the 
choice set contains only two or three alternatives (e.g. non-participation, part-time and full-time). 
More common, however, is the approach of choosing a few equally spaced points in the interval [0,H], 
without taking into account the possibility that some type of opportunities maybe more easily available 
than others. Other authors (Aaberge et al. 1995, 1999, 2004) do account for this possibility as well as 
for the relative density of jobs as a function of personal characteristics (see Section 2). In practice, 
their specification boils down to “augmenting” the term v with a set of appropriately defined dummy 
variables. Also van Soest (1995) introduces similar dummies, although he gives them a different 
interpretation in terms of utility costs or premia attached to some range of hour values6. 
3.3 The simulation exercise 
In what follows we use the sample generated according to the true model to estimate various versions 
of models generated according to the various possible representations of the choice set as discussed 
above. In these models the wage rate is kept fixed for each individual, i.e. it does not vary across 
alternatives as it is allowed for in the “true” model; moreover it is simultaneously estimated as in 
(2.12), instead we use a wage equation to predict the wage for non-participants7. This simplification is 
introduced in order to make the simulation results more easily interpretable.  
 The more general versions of the models are 
(3.7) 
( )( )
( )( )
0 0 1 1 2 2
0 0 1 1 2 2
exp ( , ), ( ) ( ) ( ) ln ( , )
( , )
exp ( , ), ( ) ( ) ( ) ln ( , )
s s s s s s s s
s s
i i i i i i i i
i S
v f w h I h d h d h d h q w h
P w h S
v f w h I h d h d h d h q w h
θ π π
θ π π
∈
+ + + −
=
+ + + −∑
 
when sampled alternatives are used, and 
(3.8) 
( )( )
( )( )
0 0 1 1 2 2
0 0 1 1 2 2
exp ( , ), ( ) ( ) ( )
( , )
exp ( , ), ( ) ( ) ( )
s s s s s
s s
i i i i i
i R
v f w h I h d h d h d h
P w h R
v f w h I h d h d h d h
θ π π
θ π π
∈
+ + +
=
+ + +∑
 
                                                     
6 There is still another approach, the so called Dogit model (Gaudry and Dagenais, 1979), to represent a non-uniform 
availability of alternatives. It is a generalization of the logit model, where the decision-maker may – with a given probability 
– be “captive” to one of the alternatives or otherwise choose freely from the whole choice set.  The Dogit model has been 
recently used by Harris and Duncan (2002) in a labour supply application. We do not consider the Dogit model in the 
simulation exercise presented here.  
7 The estimates of the wage equation are available upon request from the authors. 
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when fixed alternatives are used. The dummies 0 ( )id h  and 1 2( ( ), ( ))i id h d h are defined as in (2.13). 
Dropping the job dummy 0 ( )id h  and/or the peaks dummies 1 2( ( ), ( ))i id h d h generates a more restrictive 
version of the model. The choice sets S and R contain alternatively 6 or 24 points. Altogether with 
have 16 models resulting from the combinations of the following possibilities: 
 
1. alternative generation: fixed or sampled 
2. number of alternatives: 6 or 24 
3. job dummy: included or dropped 
4. peaks dummies: included or dropped 
 
In the following sections they are named as in Table 3.1. The parameter estimates of the 16 models are 
reported in the Appendix.   
 
Table 3.1. Types of models 
 Fixed alternatives Sampled alternatives 
Model Model Ia Model Ib Model Ic Model Id Model IIa 
Model 
IIb 
Model 
IIc 
Model 
IId 
Job dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Peaks 
dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Number of 
alternatives 6 6 6 6 24 24 24 24 
 
The parameter estimates of the 16 models are reported in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix.   
4. Evaluation of the different modelling approaches 
In order to evaluate the impact of alternative representations of the choice set on the performance of 
the models we proceed in the following way. First, for each of the 16 models we predict participation 
rates, hours of work and disposable income. The predictions are obtained individual by individual, 
evaluating the utility function – including the stochastic component drawn from the Type I extreme 
value distribution – at each alternative and identifying the selected alternative as the one with the 
highest utility level. The individual predictions are then aggregated into the 10 means of the 10 income 
deciles. Next, we introduce the following summary measure of prediction performance zk for model k, 
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(4.1) 
2
10
1
( )
=
⎛ ⎞−
= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
%kj j
k
j j
y y
z
y
, k=1, 2 …,16, 
where yj and kjy~  denote the outcomes in decile j of the true model and alternative model k, 
respectively. The outcomes are alternatively defined to be the job participation rate, hours of work and 
disposable income after tax.  
 Next, we carry out a regression analysis where z is treated as a response variable and the 
following variables are treated as co-variates,  
1 1=x  if the choice alternatives are sampled (= 0 if the choice alternatives are fixed), 
2 1=x  if the number of choice alternatives is equal to 24 (= 0 if the number of alternatives is equal to 
6), 
3 1=x  when it is accounted for job entry (= 0 when it is not accounted for job entry), 
4 1=x  when it is accounted for part-time and full-time peaks (= 0 when it is not accounted for part-
time and full-time peaks).  
 The following equation forms the basis of the evaluation of alternative modelling 
approaches, 
(4.2) 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 34 3 4( )= + + + + + ∗z x x x x x xα α α α α α , 
where the coefficients a will measure the relevance of the different ways of specifying the choice set.  
 Since the most important application of labour supply models is the evaluation of tax and 
welfare policy reforms, we focus on the prediction performance under alternative tax regimes. 
Namely, the steps above are repeated twice: 
- Prediction of the outcomes under the current tax regime 
- Prediction of the outcomes after the introduction of a flat tax (keeping total tax revenue 
constant).  
4.1. Outcomes under the current tax regime 
Tables 4.1 – 4.3 illustrate the results of the exercise under the current tax regime. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
refer to the eight models with fixed alternatives. In order to simplify the illustration we limit ourselves 
to the models without job and peaks dummies and to the models with both types of dummies. For each 
of the models and each of the 10 income deciles, we report the predictions of participation rates and 
hours of work in Table 4.1 and of after tax disposable income in Table 4.2. We do not report here the 
analogous results for the models with sampled alternatives, since they are very close to those with 
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fixed alternatives. Even a causal inspection of the tables suggests that the prediction performance is 
pretty good whatever the model considered. Possibly the only entries where there seems to be some 
substantial error depending on the model used are the predictions of outcomes for the first decile. In 
any case, in order to systematically assess the impact of the characteristics of all the 16 models we run 
the regression (4.2) and report the results in Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.1  Prediction of participation rates and hours of work under the 1994 tax system. Fixed-
alternatives models  
True model Model Ia Model Id Model IIa Model IId 
Deciles 
Partici-
pation 
rates 
(per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
Partici-
pation 
rates  
(per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
Partici-
pation 
rates 
 (per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
Partici-
pation 
rates 
(per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
Partici-
pation 
rates  
(per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
1 58 568 55 627 43 514 87 733 55 568 
2 65 715 73 818 61 730 93 837 67 708 
3 79 937 81 1000 71 890 95 989 79 941 
4 86 1157 87 1179 80 1130 97 1125 85 1153 
5 91 1389 92 1375 87 1397 96 1276 90 1352 
6 93 1527 94 1494 91 1541 98 1429 93 1528 
7 93 1606 95 1638 91 1650 99 1598 94 1631 
8 94 1695 94 1701 92 1735 98 1667 93 1672 
9 94 1757 95 1812 93 1838 99 1746 96 1771 
10 88 1523 89 1631 83 1566 97 1676 87 1567 
Mean 84 1287 86 1327 79 1299 96 1308 84 1289 
 
 
Table 4.2  Prediction of disposable income (in NOK) under the 1994 tax system. Fixed-
alternatives models  
Deciles True model Model Ia Model Id Model IIa Model IId 
1 168915 170648 169098 171945 168690 
2 216080 217801 215357 219415 216333 
3 244914 245504 243740 245176 243672 
4 268880 268308 267340 267880 267659 
5 290441 290083 290556 288798 289893 
6 312088 312113 313719 310410 312446 
7 336247 335829 337305 334374 336148 
8 363833 364607 365453 362513 363739 
9 403513 405063 405654 403401 404046 
10 600841 605283 602163 608705 604516 
Mean 320575 321524 321038 321262 320714 
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Table 4.3. Estimates of equation (4.2) outcomes under the current tax regime  
Outcome variable 0α  1α  2α  3α  4α  34α  R
2 
Probability of 
participation 
.406 
(.123) 
-.075 
(.100) 
.126 
(.100) 
-.266 
(.142) 
.086 
(.142) 
-.076 
(.201) .54 
Hours of work  .266 (.057) 
-.023 
(.046) 
.070 
(.046) 
-.178 
(.007) 
-.004 
(.007) 
.031 
(.092) .60 
Income after tax  .021 (.008) 
-.002 
(.004) 
.007 
(.004) 
-.009 
(.006) 
-.002 
(.006) 
-.003 
(.008) .50 
*Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
The results of Table 4.3 confirm the message conveyed by Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Very few coefficients 
are significant at standard levels (the significant ones are in bold italics). Overall one can conclude that 
there is little evidence of an important impact of alternative modes of representing the choice set as 
long as the replication of current values is concerned. 
4.2. Outcomes under a Flat Tax reform 
In this second part of the simulation exercise, the models are run as after a hypothetical tax reform. 
Namely, a fixed proportional tax (Flat Tax) replaces the current tax system. The flat tax is determined 
running recursively the true model until the total tax revenue is the same as under the current system. 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 are analogous to Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 replicate Tables 4.4 and 4.5, 
but with sampled-alternatives models. When it comes to reform simulations rather than current values 
replication, the differences in outcomes are somewhat more marked, and this is confirmed by Table 
4.8 where eq. (4.2) is estimated, analogous to Table 4.3, but with reference here to post-Flat-Tax 
outcomes. There is a rather clear pattern of the effects of different modelling strategies in particular on 
the prediction of disposable income. For example, using 24 alternatives instead of 6 reduces the 
average percentage error by 0.8 per cent. Using sampled-alternatives instead of fixed alternatives 
reduces it by 1.9 per cent, introducing job and peaks dummies reduces it by 3.2 per cent. Moreover, 
the detailed information provided by Tables 4.4 - 4.7 demonstrates that the less satisfactory out-of-
sample prediction performance arises from discrepancies between the lower parts of the predicted and 
“observed” flat-tax distributions of hours of work and disposable income.  
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Table 4.4  Prediction of participation rates and hours of work under a flat tax reform. Fixed-
alternatives models  
True model Model Ia Model Id Model IIa Model IId 
Deciles 
Partici-
pation 
rates 
(per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
Partici-
pation 
rates  
(per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
Partici-
pation 
rates 
 (per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
Partici-
pation 
rates 
(per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
Partici-
pation 
rates  
(per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
1 69 987 62 835 55 826 89 946 63 890 
2 75 1022 77 943 68 966 95 1041 74 943 
3 84 1160 83 1100 76 1117 96 1145 83 1134 
4 89 1315 89 1260 83 1279 97 1271 87 1291 
5 93 1491 93 1432 89 1488 97 1392 91 1459 
6 94 1609 94 1542 92 1626 98 1543 93 1609 
7 94 1659 95 1677 92 1717 99 1685 94 1670 
8 95 1742 94 1735 92 1786 98 1727 93 1720 
9 95 1794 96 1843 94 1898 99 1811 96 1821 
10 88 1549 89 1647 84 1619 97 1721 88 1606 
Mean 88 1487 87 1401 82 1432 96 1428 86 1414 
 
 
Table 4.5.  Prediction of disposable income (in NOK) under a flat tax reform. Fixed-alternatives 
models 
Deciles True model Model Ia Model Id Model IIa Model IId 
1 194076 171081 177612 173092 177934 
2 234263 214268 220564 222704 220524 
3 259189 242704 250457 247374 248492 
4 279624 266384 272361 271441 271579 
5 301124 289038 294062 293453 294681 
6 323777 314124 320755 319278 319492 
7 350809 342509 349310 346358 344397 
8 383958 375740 379893 378941 377972 
9 431297 426513 431747 430622 428668 
10 651815 649764 651885 657771 652667 
Mean 340993 329213 334865 334103 333641 
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Table 4.6. Prediction of participation rates and hours of work under a flat tax reform. Sampled-
alternatives models   
True model Model Ia Model Id Model IIa Model IId 
Deciles 
Partici-
pation 
rates 
(per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
Partici-
pation 
rates  
(per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
Partici-
pation 
rates 
 (per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
Partici-
pation 
rates 
(per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
Partici-
pation 
rates  
(per 
cent) 
Annual 
hours of 
work 
1 69 987 76 915 65 883 76 921 65 880 
2 75 1022 83 982 74 993 84 985 75 992 
3 84 1160 90 1159 83 1131 90 1151 83 1133 
4 89 1315 92 1288 88 1330 93 1307 89 1338 
5 93 1491 94 1449 91 1493 94 1460 91 1485 
6 94 1609 95 1580 94 1650 95 1579 94 1646 
7 94 1659 95 1671 93 1691 96 1675 93 1695 
8 95 1742 97 1759 96 1775 97 1771 96 1774 
9 95 1794 98 1806 96 1811 98 1807 96 1814 
10 88 1549 92 1606 88 1587 92 1617 88 1586 
Mean 88 1487 91 1422 87 1434 91 1427 87 1434 
 
 
Table 4.7. Prediction of disposable income (in NOK) under a flat tax reform. Sampled-
alternatives models 
Deciles True model Model Ia Model Id Model IIa Model IId 
1 194076 175360 178959 175829 178558 
2 234263 221008 223384 220745 222943 
3 259189 248332 249373 247584 249304 
4 279624 272276 275414 273516 275739 
5 301124 293241 296123 293368 295567 
6 323777 318317 321883 318698 321400 
7 350809 346147 348328 346124 348868 
8 383958 377469 379296 378295 378984 
9 431297 430380 430587 429954 431015 
10 651815 651514 650805 652383 650766 
Mean 340993 333404 335415 333650 335314 
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Table 4.8. Contributions to the prediction performance: outcomes under a flat tax reform 
Outcome variable 0α  1α  2α  3α  4α  34α  R
2 
Probability of 
participation 
.215 
(.008) 
-.090 
(.064) 
.060 
(.062) 
-.110 
(.091) 
.077 
(.091) 
-.073 
(.129) .47 
Hours of work  .093 (.013) 
-.061 
(.010) 
-.023 
(.010) 
-.003 
(.014) 
-.001 
(.014) 
.012 
(.020) .82 
Income after tax  .128 (.006) 
-.019 
(.005) 
-.008 
(.005) 
-.029 
(.007) 
-.039 
(.007) 
.036 
(0.01) .84 
*Standard deviation in parentheses 
4.3. Computational costs 
The different representations of the choice set imply different computational burdens, particularly with 
regards to the number of alternatives and to the procedure used to generate the alternatives. Depending 
on the availability of computing resources and time, the advantages of the various approaches to 
represent the choice set should be balanced against the computational costs. Table 4.9 reports the 
relative elapsed time ( = 1 for the simplest model8) of a typical estimation run with four different type 
of models: fixed vs sampled alternatives and 6 vs 24 alternatives (accounting or not accounting for job 
and peaks dummies does not make any significant difference in terms of computation time). 
 
Table 4.9. Relative computation time (estimation) for different models 
 6 alternatives 24 alternatives 
Fixed alternatives 1 4.62 
Sampled alternatives 6.70 8.46 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have performed a series of simulation exercises aimed at exploring the performance of different 
versions of a labour supply model, where different approaches to represent choice sets are used. The 
various models are estimated using a large sample generated by a “true” model, to which they can then 
be compared. In evaluating the models, we focus upon their ability, replicate the “true” outcomes 
under different tax regimes. It turns out that as far as the replication of the current-tax-regime 
outcomes are concerned, there is little evidence for important effects of alternative choice-set-
                                                     
8
 The absolute computing time for estimating the simplest model was 2.42 seconds on a Alpha ES45, 1 Gb Mhz, 8 Gb work-
space memory 
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representation procedures. Not even the number of alternatives contained in the choice set seems to 
matter. All the models predict very well, although there are some indications favouring the sampled-
alternatives procedure. However, when it comes to predicting outcomes under a flat-tax reform, the 
indications are more clear-cut: using sampled alternatives and accounting for heterogeneity of 
opportunities seems to significantly reduce the prediction errors (at least for the prediction of 
incomes). Clearly the sampled-alternative procedure is more costly computationally, so the benefits 
should eventually be balanced against the increased computational costs.  
 The prediction performance of current values does not discriminate between different 
models but the prediction performance of post-reform does: these results convey the important 
message that the ability of a model to replicate observed outcomes is not very informative. Ultimately, 
the models should be judged in their ability to do the job they are mainly built for, i.e. predicting the 
outcomes of policy changes.  
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Appendix 
 
Here we report the parameter estimates of the true model and of the 16 alternative models. 
 
Table A.1. Fixed-alternatives models Ix and IIx (x = a, b, c)   
Variable Para-meter 
True 
model 
Model 
Ia 
Model
IIa 
Model
Ib 
Model
IIb 
Model
Ic 
Model 
IIc 
Model 
Id 
Model
IId 
Consumption           
 α1 0.39 0.35 0.54 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.44 
 α2 4.42 2.46 3.70 3.97 4.55 4.05 4.64 4.17 4.38 
Leisure 
 
         
 α3 -4.57 -7.53 -3.18 -7.31 -6.72 -2.07 -0.14 -3.99 -4.15 
 α4 168.88 54.20 184.85 64.76 92.39 232.99 351.30 156.91 171.12 
Log age α5 -94.29 -30.46 -102.83 -36.27 -51.64 -128.78 -193.30 -87.38 -95.45 
Log age 
squared α6 13.35 4.32 14.62 5.15 7.33 18.27 27.48 12.40 13.54 
Number of 
children below 
3 years old 
α7 0.44 0.13 0.51 0.13 0.19 0.61 0.95 0.38 0.40 
Number of 
children 
3-6 years old 
α8 1.23 0.48 1.68 0.53 0.76 1.86 2.99 1.25 1.40 
Number of 
children  
7-14 years old 
α9 1.05 0.40 1.37 0.44 0.62 1.53 2.47 1.04 1.14 
Job dummy θ0 -0.60 - - -1.08 -2.33 - - -0.78 -2.10 
Part-time 
dummy 1π  0.46 - - - - -0.23 0.14 0.15 0.28 
Full-time 
dummy 2π  1.57 - - - - 0.99 1.53 0.78 1.19 
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Table A.2. Sampled-alternatives models Ix and IIx (x = a, b, c)   
Variable Para-meter 
True 
model 
Model 
Ia 
Model
IIa 
Model
Ib 
Model
IIb 
Model
Ic 
Model 
IIc 
Model 
Id 
Model
IId 
Consumption           
 α1 0.39 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.53 
 α2 4.42 3.96 3.93 4.72 4.64 4.56 4.51 4.70 4.62 
Leisure 
 
         
 α3 -4.57 -5.15 -5.27 -5.94 -6.10 -2.40 -2.49 -3.52 -3.60 
 α4 168.88 125.90 121.50 112.19 106.31 234.88 231.26 195.26 190.72 
Log age α5 -94.29 -70.17 -67.75 -62.54 -59.28 -129.94 -128.03 -108.43 -105.95
Log age 
squared α6 13.35 9.96 9.62 8.88 8.42 18.46 18.19 15.39 15.04 
Number of 
children below 
3 years old 
α7 0.44 0.33 0.30 0.25 0.23 0.66 0.58 0.50 0.44 
Number of 
children 
3-6 years old 
α8 1.23 1.07 1.05 0.91 0.87 1.94 1.95 1.56 1.57 
Number of 
children  
7-14 years old 
α9 1.05 0.88 0.88 0.75 0.73 1.61 1.65 1.29 1.33 
Job dummy θ0 -0.60 - - -0.88 -0.86 - - -0.63 -0.60 
Part-time 
dummy 1π  0.46 - - - - 0.44 0.44 0.53 0.52 
Full-time 
dummy 2π  1.57 - - - - 1.66 1.63 1.56 1.54 
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